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PART I: OUTLINING THE PROBLEM
In 1990, Earl Shriner, a released pedophile, raped a seven-year1
old boy, severed the boy’s penis, and left him to die. The public
outrage that followed this horrific incident in Tacoma, Washington
led to the passage of that state’s Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”)
law. The law provides for post-incarceration psychiatric commitment
of sex offenders who suffer from a “mental abnormality or personality
2
disorder” that makes them sexually dangerous.
State officials
deemed the legislation necessary to protect the public against
individuals like Shriner whom they had been unable to detain under
the state’s involuntary psychiatric commitment standard following
3
release from prison. Legislators believed that the adoption of a
standard that specifically targeted sexual dangerousness while
incorporating ambiguous mental impairment language would
facilitate sex-offender commitment.
They were right. In the first twelve years of enforcement, 164
4
individuals were committed under the law. But Washington is not
alone. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted SVP
5
statutes patterned closely on Washington’s. As of the spring of 2002,
some 2,229 individuals—virtually all of them male—were civilly
∗
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detained or committed nationally as sexually violent predators.
Commentators have debated both the constitutionality of these
7
statutes and their merit as a matter of public policy. Whatever their
pros and cons, the Supreme Court’s vindication of this approach to
managing the risks posed by mentally-disordered sex offenders in
8
Kansas v. Hendricks presages the continuation of the practice for the
foreseeable future. As such, our attention must now focus on the
9
issues of statutory implementation and release from confinement.
The latter is especially critical. While state and local prosecutors have
been very successful in securing commitments, detainees have been
profoundly unsuccessful in gaining releases. For example, in the
State of Washington, fewer than ten civilly-committed SVPs have been
granted conditional release from institutional confinement due, in
large part, to the refusal of state officials to recommend discharge in
10
any form.
Likewise, in Minnesota, only one patient gained
conditional discharge over a twenty-year period under that state’s
11
SVP and sexual psychopath commitment statutes.
This intransigence on the part of state officials with respect to
release must ultimately give way, however, if SVP commitment is to
remain constitutionally viable. In Hendricks, where the Justices split
five to four on the issue of whether Kansas’s SVP law was
unconstitutionally punitive, Justice Kennedy recognized the statute’s
12
potential to convert civil detention into “confinement for life.” To
6
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this end, his concurrence warned state officials not to use the civil
system “to impose punishment after the State makes an improvident
13
plea bargain on the criminal side”; while incapacitation is a
legitimate objective of psychiatric hospitalization, deterrence and
retribution are not.
The indefinite detention of all those committed as SVPs would
promote the conflation of civil and criminal incapacitation of which
Justice Kennedy warns. Recognizing, perhaps, the untenability of this
result, some jurisdictions have begun to release SVPs into the
community in greater numbers. For example, whereas only forty14
nine SVPs had gained release by the year 2000, sixty-nine were
15
released by 2002—an increase of over forty percent.
As these numbers increase, the need for community-based
treatment will grow as well. This eventuality will create a significant
problem because of the critical shortage of clinicians qualified to
16
treat this unique patient population. Indeed, given the difficulty
jurisdictions have had in securing resources to hire and train
psychologists and social workers to staff their inpatient programs, it is
hard to imagine how burgeoning outpatient needs will be satisfied.
For example, at the time of his initial SVP commitment, Leroy
Hendricks was receiving treatment that was non-existent at worst and
17
“meager” at best. Even ten months later, the facility’s clinical
director testified that SVPs were receiving essentially no treatment
18
and that the program was woefully understaffed.
The State of Washington has encountered similar problems in
implementing its SVP statute. In 1994, a superior court judge found
that the state’s Special Commitment Center (“SCC”) for SVPs was
failing to provide constitutionally adequate treatment based, inter
alia, on the “[l]ack of sufficient staff trained, experienced and
19
certified in [the] treatment of sex offenders.” That same year, a
federal court also found the treatment program to be constitutionally

13
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inadequate.
The court entered an injunction requiring
improvements in a host of areas, including staffing, in order to bring
21
the SCC into constitutional compliance. Five years later, however,
the SCC remained non-compliant principally because of the state’s
failure to allocate sufficient resources for necessities such as staffing
22
and training. Only after an order of contempt was entered against
the state in November 1999, which assessed significant monetary
penalties for each day the SCC remained non-compliant, did the state
allocate the resources necessary to provide adequate staffing and
23
treatment.
The problems associated with resource availability for inpatient
treatment are even more pronounced in the outpatient context.
Consider, for example, the situation in New Jersey. New Jersey is
relatively unusual in that it has a separate correctional facility in
24
Avenel for repetitive and compulsive sex offenders. Inmates housed
at this facility receive therapy throughout their period of
incarceration. Those who are civilly committed as sexually violent
predators at the end of their sentences, whether or not they had
25
served their time at Avenel, would also receive therapy at state
20
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Id. at 1154, 1160.
24
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:47-1 (West Supp. 2004), which states:
[w]henever a person is convicted of the offense of aggravated sexual
assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, kidnapping
pursuant to paragraph (2) of subsection c. of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-1,
endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct
which would impair or debauch the morals of the child pursuant to
subsection a. of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4, endangering the welfare of a
child pursuant to paragraph (4) of subsection b. of N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:24-4, or an attempt to commit any such crime, the judge shall order
the Department of Corrections to complete a psychological
examination of the offender, except the judge shall not require a
psychological examination if the offender is to be sentenced to a term
of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole. The examination
shall include a determination of whether the offender’s conduct was
characterized by a pattern of repetitive compulsive behavior and, if it
was, a further determination of the offender’s amenability to sex
offender treatment and willingness to participate in such treatment.
The court’s order shall contain a determination of the offender’s legal
settlement in accordance with subdivision D of article 3 of chapter 4 of
Title 30 of the Revised Statutes.
25
That is, not all sex offenders are separately housed at Avenel. Some are
excluded because they do not meet the “repetitive and compulsive” standard; others
are ineligible because, while they satisfy these criteria, they refuse to engage in
treatment and thus must remain in the general prison population.
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expense. Once released into the community from either criminal or
civil detention, however, state-sponsored treatment is available only at
the correctional facility in Avenel.
Parolees who are unable to access those services are seriously
disadvantaged. They may look to the state’s network of community
mental health centers, but very few have expertise in sex-offender
therapy and many will not accept sex offenders as clients. Conversely,
paroled sex offenders may attempt to locate qualified therapists on
their own, but, even if successful, the cost will ultimately prove
prohibitive to many. At present, a federal grant funds aftercare
services at selected district parole offices for sex offenders whom the
26
court has ordered to participate in Community Supervision for Life;
thus, at least some released sex offenders who cannot access Avenel
have treatment options available to them. The grant expires,
however, in December 2004.
As the foregoing illustrates, even in New Jersey, which is among
the most proactive states with respect to providing sex-offender
treatment, individuals released from SVP commitment have no
guarantee of continued access to therapeutic intervention. Ironically,
because individuals released from SVP commitment are less likely
than paroled sex offenders to be subject to Community Supervision
for Life, they would be far less likely, as a group, to benefit from the
treatment services provided through the federal grant. As mentioned
above, even if released SVPs manage to find treatment providers on
their own, their ability to pay for these services long term is
questionable. Of course, the converse is equally true. In areas far
from Avenel and the state’s urban centers, SVPs are likely to find it
difficult to find clinicians qualified to treat them, whether or not they
can pay for those services.
For the time being, these problems are speculative since no one
has yet been released from SVP commitment in New Jersey, other
than by court order. In other jurisdictions, where SVPs have been
conditionally discharged, treatment policies vary. In Wisconsin, for
27
example, the state does pay for (and require) outpatient treatment.
In Minnesota, by contrast, the state will pay for Depo-Provera, an
antiandrogen medication, but not for group or individual
28
psychotherapy. As time passes, and SVPs are released in greater
26
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numbers, current policies introduce the alarming notion that
mentally disordered sex offenders may be released into the
community without necessary therapeutic supports. The specter of
relapse is troubling not only for the individual but for ordinary
citizens as well, as they must confront the risk to public safety
occasioned by this eventuality.
I believe that this result is not only undesirable from a policy
perspective, it offends federal constitutional principles. Due to the
unique nature of SVP commitment, and the representations states
have made to justify it, substantive due process requires statesponsored outpatient treatment for all those who gain release. This
argument does not presuppose a right to post-release treatment for
civilly committed individuals, nor does it address directly the right of
the state to detain sex offenders without treatment in a nonpsychiatric facility—though I would consider such a practice to raise
serious constitutional questions. My focus is squarely on the
treatment rights upon release of individuals civilly committed as
sexually violent predators under statutory schemes similar to the
Kansas statute addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kansas v.
Hendricks.
PART II: THE RIGHT TO INPATIENT TREATMENT
A. The Scope of the Right to Treatment
A right to community treatment would be illogical if there were
not a pre-existing right to treatment while housed inpatient. Thus,
we must first explore the parameters of inpatient treatment
requirements. While the U.S. Supreme Court has never squarely
addressed the right to treatment, the Justices have noted on several
occasions that the nature of psychiatric detention must be tailored to
29
its purpose. This mandate would not be met, in the case of sexual
predators, if they were confined in a psychiatric hospital without
treatment addressing the mental abnormality that makes them
sexually dangerous.
Contrarians may point to Justice Thomas’s embrace in Hendricks
30
of civil incapacitation as a legitimate goal of civil detention. This
fact does not suggest, however, that a failure to provide suitable
treatment over time would be acceptable as a matter of substantive
due process. On the contrary, Justice Thomas noted that confining
29

See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 87-88 (1992) (O’Connor, J.,
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30
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SVPs to an institution “expressly designed to provide psychiatric care
and treatment” clearly “satisfied its obligation to provide available
31
treatment.” This choice of words is informative, because the statutory
32
language, relied on elsewhere in the opinion, nowhere references
the phrase “available treatment.” It would seem, therefore, that the
majority is promoting a freestanding duty of state officials towards
those whom they choose to confine in mental health facilities.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy warned that, while lifelong detention
may be the “practical effect” of SVP commitment, if it is the statute’s
very intention, the confinement it prescribes is indistinguishable from
33
criminal incarceration and is therefore impermissible. A contrary
purpose is demonstrated most persuasively by the provision of
treatment. In this regard, the “presently available treatment”
standard referenced by the Hendricks majority has significant roots.
34
For example, in the seminal case of Rouse v. Cameron, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held that, to justify psychiatric detention,
a state must endeavor to provide treatment that is “adequate in light
35
of present knowledge.” To demonstrate that they are fulfilling this
obligation in good faith, state officials must monitor a patient’s status
by making “initial and periodic inquiries” to facilitate the creation of
36
a therapeutic program “suitable to his particular needs.”
Rouse v. Cameron provides a ready framework for interpreting the
treatment standard forwarded in Hendricks. Its emphasis on patients’
needs and the development of individualized treatment programs
precludes long-term reliance on non-specific treatments, such as
“milieu” therapy, that may not prove beneficial. Rouse is also
37
consistent with Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme Court’s leading
right-to-treatment case. There, in the context of institutionalized
mentally retarded individuals, the Justices required not only that
treatment be made available, but also that it be “minimally adequate .
38
. . to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint.” The Court
added that lower courts should bestow “presumptive validity” to the

31
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judgments of “qualified professionals” in this regard.
In
determining whether the exercise of professional judgment was
proper in a given case, Youngberg accommodates the use of certain
factors, including periodic patient re-evaluation and the development
40
of individualized treatment programs.
Incorporating these
considerations serves not to usurp medical judgment, but rather ‘to
ensure that professionals . . . apply their knowledge and skills” in
41
determining the sufficiency of the state’s treatment efforts.
In sum, the foregoing uncovers that individuals who are
involuntarily committed to psychiatric hospitals have, at a minimum,
a right to presently available treatment, reasonably tailored to the
their disorder(s), and informed by professional judgment. While a
necessary precondition to any subsequent right to community-based
treatment, this entitlement to inpatient treatment does not
incorporate such a right in and of itself, in light of the lesser liberty
infringement associated with conditional release. I believe, however,
that SVPs who are conditionally discharged from civil confinement
do, in fact, have such a right. As I will explain in the next section,
this right derives from a fusion of the justification proffered by state
officials in committing SVPs initially and the theoretical
underpinnings of the right-to-treatment case law.
B. The Theoretical Underpinnings of the Right to Treatment
Having examined the potential scope of a right to treatment, we
must now consider its historical foundations. Among the various
theories that courts and commentators have forwarded to justify a
42
right to treatment, two have particular relevance in the case of SVPs.
The first straightforwardly relies on the statutory guarantee of
treatment. For example, in Rouse v. Camaron, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia cited language in the federal 1964
39

Id. at 322-23.
See, e.g., Janet D. v. Carros, 362 A.2d 1060 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
41
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317, 319-20 (1982). For a fuller discussion
of these issues, see John Kip Cornwell, Understanding the Role of the Police and Parens
Patriae Powers in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 377, 408-12
(1998).
42
A third theory relies on the state’s authority as parens patriae to provide care
and treatment for those citizens who are unable to care for themselves. Accordingly,
due process requires treatment when citizens are deprived of liberty “upon the
altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons.” Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (D. Ala. 1971). Because the civil confinement of
sexual predators is based overwhelmingly on the state’s police power authority to
protect its citizens rather than its beneficient parens patriae powers, this theory has
little relevance in this context.
40
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Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act specifying “[a] person
hospitalized in a public hospital for a mental illness shall, during his
hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and
43
44
treatment.” Likewise, in Welsch v. Likins, the district court derived a
treatment mandate from statutory authority permitting state officials
to hospitalize involuntarily any “mentally deficient” individual who
“requires treatment or supervision for his own good or the public
45
welfare.”
Since hospitals were defined in the statute as places
“equipped to provide care and treatment,” when state officials choose
to place citizens in hospitals against their will, those citizens have a
46
right to receive treatment.
The SVP statutes also reference treatment, as this prototypical
provision from the State of Washington illustrates:
The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group
of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental
disease or defect that renders them appropriate for the existing
involuntary treatment act . . . which is intended to be a short-term
civil commitment system that is primarily designed to provide
short-term treatment to individuals with serious mental disorders
and then return them to the community. [By] contrast, sexually
violent predators generally have personality disorders and/or
mental abnormalities which are unamenable to existing mental
illness treatment modalities and those conditions render them
likely to engage in sexually violent behavior. The legislature
further finds that sex offenders’ likelihood of engaging in repeat
acts of predatory sexual violence is high . . . . The legislature
further finds that the prognosis for curing sexually violent
offenders is poor, the treatment needs of this population are very
long term, and the treatment modalities for this population are
very different than the traditional treatment modalities for people
appropriate for commitment under the involuntary treatment
act.47

In Hendricks, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that Kansas’s
SVP law, which is fundamentally similar to Washington’s, obligates
48
state officials to provide treatment.
It does not matter that the
primary purpose of these laws is to separate those committed under
them from society. Even if treatment is merely an “ancillary” goal,
43

Rouse, 373 F.2d at 453.
373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
45
Id. at 500 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.02 subd. 5).
46
Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.02 subd. 8).
47
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2004); see also 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws
§ 10; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6606 (West 2004).
48
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367.
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having declared that the state will provide it, it cannot fail to do so.
A second justification for a right to treatment, known as the quid
50
pro quo theory, posits that the state must give individuals who are
involuntarily civilly committed something in exchange for their loss
51
of liberty.
If the restraint on freedom is based on a need for
treatment, the quid pro quo is the provision of that treatment. It
does not matter if treatment is not the primary motivation for
detention; even if the deprivation of liberty is based only in part on
the promise of treatment, the representation is sufficient to force the
52
state’s hand.

PART III: LOCATING A RIGHT TO POST-RELEASE COMMUNITY
TREATMENT FOR SVPS
While the foregoing identifies a right to presently available
treatment for civilly committed SVPs based on a statutory guarantee
and a quid pro quo theory, these considerations do not suggest that
SVPs have any right to state-sponsored treatment once they are
discharged into the community. State constitutions may provide
53
certain community-treatment rights for mentally ill individuals.
There may also be some entitlement to community-based services
based on state statutes. These provisions are likely, however, to
54
provide only short-term treatment and to face practical challenges
55
based on funding shortages.
A. Statutory and Quid Pro Quo Imperatives
Significantly, no court has yet to embrace any federal
49

Id.
See, e.g., Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the Experts: From Deference to
Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 687-88 (1992).
51
See, e.g., Gary W. v. Louisiana, 427 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D. La. 1976) (holding
that where an individual is confined against his will for reason other than
commission of criminal offense, the state must provide a benefit in exchange for loss
of liberty), aff’d on other grounds, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Donaldson v.
O’Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that outside the criminal
context, “there must be a quid pro quo extended by the government to justify
confinement”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
52
See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 326 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
53
Anthony B. Klapper, Comment, Finding a Right in State Constitutions for
Community Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 739 (1993).
54
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-185 (1991) (obligating state mental health
department “to provide adequate transitional treatment and care for all patients
released after a period of involuntary confinement”).
55
Klapper, supra note 53, at 816.
50
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constitutional obligation to provide treatment once discharged from
institutional confinement. I believe, however, that such a right does
exist for individuals committed under modern SVP statutes. This
obligation derives principally from the legislative “findings”
highlighted above. Those findings specify that SVPs subject to civil
commitment: (1) are extremely sexually dangerous; (2) are likely to
reoffend; and (3) have “very long-term” treatment needs that are
different from those of other individuals subject to involuntary
56
psychiatric detention. Because SVPs typically do not have a mental
disorder sufficient to qualify them for commitment under preexisting standards for involuntary psychiatric detention, “special” laws
are necessary and should be specifically tailored to SVPs’ unique
57
mental impairment and the resulting dangers it produces.
Drawing a distinction between SVPs and other psychiatric
patients makes sense. Many of the latter have mental illnesses that,
based on pharmacological advances, do not require long-term
confinement. Accordingly, involuntary psychiatric commitment is
ordinarily intended “to provide short-term treatment to individuals
with serious mental disorders and then return them to the
58
community.” Once in the community, these individuals can receive
follow-up services through the network of clinical providers available
privately or through community mental health centers.
SVPs, however, are very differently situated. Unlike other
59
psychiatric patients, their mental “abnormalities” require specialized,
60
long-term treatment. The goal of treatment for this “small group of
61
extremely dangerous” mentally disordered sex offenders is not to
“cure” them; indeed, the state has acknowledged that these
62
individuals have little chance of being “cured” of their disorders.
Instead, treatment is designed to achieve a degree of recovery
sufficient to allow them to re-enter the community.
Since discharged SVPs are not “cured,” it would be unrealistic at
best, and disingenuous at worst, to expect that they would be able to

56

See supra text accompanying note 47.
Not all SVP statutes explicitly contain the legislative findings referenced above.
However, the statutes are fundamentally similar in all significant respects in terms of
content, sentiment and intent; all provide for treatment; and all are patterned after
the Washington statute which did contain such findings. Thus, it is appropriate to
give the findings full force when construing SVP statutes.
58
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2004).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
57
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sustain their progress without therapeutic reinforcement. As the
discussion in Part I indicated, however, the willingness to provide this
63
treatment varies widely among the states.
This problem is
compounded when SVPs relocate to areas away from urban centers
where clinicians experienced in providing sex-offender therapy are in
especially short supply or, when services are available but released
SVPs cannot afford them.
It is my belief that states are obligated, as a matter of
constitutional due process, to provide these services to discharged
SVPs. States cannot justify their authority to confine SVPs in a
psychiatric facility indefinitely to address their unique, long-term
treatment needs and then refuse, upon conditional release, to
provide the very treatment that they have acknowledged is necessary
to allow them to gain their freedom. The state would be effectively
saying: “You have a special condition that makes you dangerous and,
because of it, we are going to confine you for a long time during
which you will be treated to reduce that risk. At the point at which
your therapy has succeeded such that you can begin to re-integrate
into the community, we can stop providing treatment so that you can
regress and return to inpatient hospitalization for another indefinite
period.”
In addition to contravening the state’s statutory guarantee, this
result would also violate quid pro quo principles. The state would, on
the one hand, justify the restraint on liberty by the need for ongoing,
long-term treatment to restore it and, on the other hand, take that
treatment away the moment its success became manifest. As Judge
Becker of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted, “due
process dictates that the benefit to which the civilly committed are
entitled is the habilitation to enable them to leave their
64
commitment.”
By denying SVPs the right to state-sponsored,
outpatient treatment, the state would be nullifying this entitlement.
This is not only unjust, it invokes the kind of animus that Justice
Kennedy warned of in Hendricks. There, the Justice noted, that when
civil confinement becomes a mechanism for retribution or general
deterrence, it loses its constitutional moorings. The problem is not
65
that committed SVPs face potentially life-long commitment; the
difficulty lies, instead, with structuring a civil commitment system to
promote that result.

63
64
65

See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 94 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J., concurring).
Hendrcks, 521 U.S. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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B. The Role of Treatment Efficacy
Critics may argue against my position on the ground that
treatment is insufficiently effective to obligate the state to provide it
upon conditional release. Indeed, treatment efficacy remains a
66
controversial topic among commentators and researchers.
Arguably, the most comprehensive review of the psychological
treatment for sex offenders is that conducted by the Collaborative
Outcome Data Project Committee. In 2002, the project’s first report
positively associated treatment with reductions in both sexual and
67
general recidivism.
In four to five years of follow-up, sexual
recidivism in the treatment group was ten percent versus seventeen
percent in the non-treatment group. Additionally, general recidivism
was at thirty-two percent for those receiving treatment versus fifty-one
68
percent for the untreated. The significance of these findings has
been challenged, however, based on alleged flaws in the research
design, including: (1) that the comparison groups were not
comparable, and (2) that the evidence was contaminated by the
inclusion in the comparison groups of higher-risk offenders who
would have refused or quit treatment if they had had the choice.
Fortunately, it is not necessary to resolve this ongoing debate
about treatment efficacy to vindicate a constitutional right to
community treatment because the states have chosen, in their
legislative findings, to declare that treatment is necessary to reduce
the risks of recidivism posed by this population. By denying
treatment upon release, the states would, by their own admission, be
setting SVPs up for failure and recommitment. In addition, by
denying SVPs the proverbial “benefit of the bargain,” the state would
extinguish the possibility of SVPs living in a less restrictive setting
66

Compare Robin Fretwell Wilson, Cradles of Abuse: Evaluating the Danger Posed by a
Sexually Predatory Parent to the Victim’s Siblings, 51 EMORY L.J. 241, 298-99 (2002)
(arguing that treatment can lower the risk of future offenses and courts should take
into account an offender’s participation in treatment), and James A. Billings &
Crystal L. Bulges, Maine’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: Wise or Wicked?,
52 ME. L. REV. 175, 243-45 (2000) (highlighting flaws in research techniques that
measure treatment efficacy, but concluding that “[t]reatment is also integral to sex
offense solutions”), with R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk
Management?, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 50, 68 (1998) (noting that research
regarding whether SVPs benefit from treatment is inconclusive), and Kirk Heilbrun
et al., Sexual Offending: Linking Assessment, Intervention, and Decision Making, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 138, 169 (1998) (concluding that “[p]rogress in treatment
is not a powerful risk-reduction indicator”).
67
R. Karl Hanson et al., First Report of the Collaborative Outcome Data Project on the
Effectiveness of Psychological Treatment for Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. &
TREATMENT 169 (2002).
68
Id.
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than that of the institution, a result which raises distinct
constitutional concerns. In litigation over Washington’s SVP statute,
a federal judge has held that providing for community transition to a
less restrictive setting is a vital and necessary part of professional
minimum standards. “Without LRAs [least restrictive alternatives],”
the court commented, “the constitutional requirement of treatment
69
leading, if successful, to cure and release cannot fully be met.”
C. Advocating Affirmative Rights
Another potential criticism of my proposal is that it
impermissibly imposes on the states affirmative obligations where the
state does not assume full custody and control over the individuals to
whom services are provided. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County
70
Department of Social Services, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
state has no constitutional duty to protect a child from his parent
after receiving reports of possible abuse. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court noted that “[a]lthough the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government
interference, it does not confer an entitlement to government aid as
71
may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.”
The context of DeShaney is distinguishable, however, from that
with which this Article is concerned. Most significantly, DeShaney
dealt with purely private conduct; the deprivation of liberty to which
the complainant was subjected was not created by the state, nor was
the minor in state custody when the violence occurred. By contrast,
even when SVPs are no longer confined institutionally, the state still
restrains their freedom substantially.
Common conditions of
discharge include, for example, mandatory supervision when outside
the residence, electronic monitoring, no drug or alcohol use, no
access to pornography, and restricted access to “vulnerable”
72
populations. Thus, the state impedes the liberty of sexual offenders,
but does offer, in exchange, treatment to allow targeted SVPs to gain
freedom. By creating this interest in treatment as part of the
commitment process, states should not be permitted to abandon it by
73
removing some restrictions on liberty.

69

Turay v. Selig, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
71
Id. at 196 (quoting Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980)).
72
Fitch, supra note 4, at 492.
73
Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that
creating constitutionally protected property interest obligates the state to support
that interest adequately).
70
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Moreover, DeShaney itself recognizes that affirmative duties of
care may exist in certain circumstances where individuals face less
than total deprivation of liberty. The Court opined that if state
officials had removed Joshua DeShaney from his home and placed
him in a foster home run by “its agents,” the situation might be
“sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give
74
rise to an affirmative duty to protect.” Like foster care, community
placement of an SVP is less restrictive than institutional care, though
the state imposes conditions and retains substantial oversight that
permits restoration of institutional custody if the situation warrants.
Thus, in both instances, this exercise of state authority and control is
sufficient to give rise to affirmative obligations on the part of the state
75
to provide care and treatment.
D. Equal Protection
Because the community treatment rights that I am advocating
would apply only to SVPs discharged from civil commitment, some
might argue that the rights of other individuals discharged from
involuntary psychiatric detention are violated under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To evaluate this
claim, it is first necessary to identify the appropriate level of scrutiny.
This task is challenging, since the U.S. Supreme Court has not
spoken with clarity about the standard of review it applies in cases
involving involuntary commitment classifications.
Early cases seemed to require only that these classifications be
76
rationally or reasonably related to legitimate government interests.
77
However, the 1992 case of Foucha v. Louisiana suggested greater
scrutiny, mandating that the state provide a “particularly convincing
reason” for continuing to commit insanity acquittees who had

74

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
See Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that public
school officials may have affirmative duties to render aid to school children under
the Due Process Clause); accord Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990); cf.
Dwares v. New York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1994) (positing that affirmative duties may
arise in the absence of state custody where state actors play a part in the liberty
deprivation).
76
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983) (concluding that it was
not “unreasonable” for Congress to provide for the “automatic” commitment of a
defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity); Jackson v. Indiana, 604 U.S. 715,
729 (1972) (requiring a “reasonable justification” for involuntary commitment
classification); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114 (1966) (stating that
“classification of patients for involuntary commitment . . . may not be wholly
arbitrary”).
77
504 U.S. 71 (1992).
75
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regained mental health. The Court’s two most recent decisions, both
concerning Kansas’s SVP law, do not explicitly reference any
particular standard of review. In Hendricks, the Court stated simply
that involuntary civil commitment statutes that “narrow[] the class of
persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control
78
their dangerousness” are constitutional. Five years later, Kansas v.
79
Crane specified that proof of a “serious difficulty in controlling
80
behavior” is an essential requirement of substantive due process.
By mandating proof of a volitional impairment not specified in
the Kansas statute, Hendricks and Crane suggest a level of scrutiny
higher than the rational basis test, which would have required
upholding the statute as written.
In addition, because the
stigmatizing effect of mental illness undermines respect and dignity
81
and promotes social isolation, I have repeatedly advocated for
heightened scrutiny in evaluating classifications affecting involuntary
82
civil commitment.
That being said, I believe that there is a “particularly convincing
83
reason” or “exceedingly persuasive justification” for treating SVPs
differently from other individuals discharged from involuntary
psychiatric detention with respect to community treatment. As
discussed above, individuals committed as SVPs have treatment needs
that are distinct from those of other patients in terms of modality and
duration, a fact which states have acknowledged in enacting this
legislation. Moreover, because the failure to provide necessary
treatment carries specific risks to public safety that are unique and
deeply troubling, the state may use different procedures to guard
against those risks.
E. Alternative Approaches to Sex Offender Commitment
Because the constitutional right to community treatment that I
78

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359.
534 U.S. 407 (2002).
80
Id. at 413.
81
L.J. Skinner et al., Generalizability and Specificity of the Stigma Associated with the
Mental Illness Label: A Reconsideration Twenty-five Years Later, 23 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL.
3 (1995).
82
See, e.g., John Kip Cornwell, Confining Mentally Disordered “Super Criminals”: A
Realignment of Rights in the Nineties, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 651, 677-89 (1996); John Kip
Cornwell, Sex Offenders and the Supreme Court: The Significance and Limits of Kansas v.
Hendricks, in PROTECTING SOCIETY, supra note 1, at 197 (2003); John Kip Cornwell &
Raymond Deeney, Exposing the Myths Surrounding Preventive Outpatient Commitment for
Individuals with Chronic Mental Illness, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 209 (2003).
83
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 529 (1996) (defining heightened
scrutiny standard in context of gender-based discrimination).
79
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am vindicating relies on legislative findings specific to SVP
commitment laws, the entitlement to such services would not
necessarily apply to discharge from other systems of civil detention.
Should we worry, therefore, that states will create alternative means of
civilly confining SVPs to avoid providing community treatment upon
release?
The experience in New Jersey is instructive in this regard. In
1994, New Jersey declared that certain sex offenders “suffer from
84
mental illness which renders them dangerous to others.”
The
legislature then facilitated their detention under the existing civil
commitment law by redefining mental illness as “a current,
substantial disturbance of thought, mood, perception or orientation
which significantly impairs judgment, capacity to control behavior or
85
capacity to recognize reality . . . .” This “clarification” of the state’s
mental illness standard was subsequently held constitutional by the
state supreme court in a case brought by a sex offender detained
86
under it. In so finding, the justices also overturned the decision of
the appellate court that the petitioner was insufficiently mentally ill to
warrant ongoing detention. Medical testimony concluding that he
suffered from an antisocial personality disorder and had fantasies of
sexual sadism were adequate to support the trial court’s order for
87
continued psychiatric detention.
The foregoing suggests that states need not resort to novel
commitment standards to manage mentally disordered SVPs. It is
curious, therefore, that more have not chosen to alter their existing
commitment standards, instead of creating a new, controversial
commitment formula. Faced, for example, with a definition of
mental illness similar to that of the unamended New Jersey statute,
88
Wisconsin chose to enact a separate SVP statute, patterned after
Washington’s, rather than altering the definition of mental illness to
achieve the same result.
Wisconsin’s reluctance may reflect a tension between the nature
and purposes of “ordinary” psychiatric commitment and that
84

Act of Oct. 31, 1994, ch. 134, § 1(a), 1994 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 542, 542 (West).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2(r) (West 1994) (emphasis added to denote
amended language).
86
In re D.C., 679 A.2d 634 (N.J. 1996).
87
Id. at 649.
88
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.01(13b) (West 1987) (“‘Mental illness,’ for purposes of
involuntary commitment, means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception
orientation, or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to
recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life, but does not
include alcoholism.”).
85
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provided under SVP statutes. Normally, the state’s civil commitment
authority is based on its parens patriae power to “provid[e] care to its
citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for
themselves” and its police power “to protect the community from the
89
dangerous tendencies of those who are mentally ill.” Because the
commitment of SVPs is primarily—some would say exclusively—an
90
exercise of states’ police power, the “profile” of committed SVPs
differs markedly from that of most psychiatric inpatients in that the
former do not typically suffer from mental disorders that pose a
danger to themselves or impair their ability to live day-to-day in a
community setting. In addition, whereas involuntary commitment is
91
designed to be short-term, the treatment needs of the SVP
92
population are necessarily long-term.
Because of these differences, attempting to force mentally
disordered sex offenders into pre-existing commitment schemes
which do not naturally fit seems unwise.
To that end,
notwithstanding the above-referenced expansion of its mental illness
93
standard, New Jersey enacted a Hendricks-style SVP statute in 1998.
The law was urged by the Task Force for the Review of the Treatment
of the Criminally Insane created by then-Governor Christine Todd
94
Whitman in 1996. When the task force invited me to meet with
them to discuss Kansas v. Hendricks and its implications for the care
and management of sexual predators, I inquired as to why New Jersey
would need an SVP statute in light of the changes made to
accommodate sex offender commitment in its existing civil
commitment statute. Those who responded opined that offenders
committed under the expanded mental illness standard were gaining
release too easily because judges and/or psychiatrists did not
consider them sufficiently mentally ill to justify indefinite detention.
Thus, special standards and procedures were necessary to identify
more specifically the particular dangers and disorders presented by
mentally disordered sex offenders.
These remarks illustrate the difficulty in managing SVPs within
the traditional civil commitment framework. It is for this reason,
perhaps, that states have not favored this approach and New Jersey
89

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
Cornwell, supra note 41, at 403; Eric S. Janus, Hendricks and the Moral Terrain of
Police Power Commitment, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 297, 302 (1998).
91
See supra text accompanying note 47.
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Id.
93
Cornwell et al., supra note 9, at 2.
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Report of the Task Force for the Review of the Treatment of the Criminally
Insane 3 (Oct. 1997) (unpublished report, on file with author).
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abandoned it. Parenthetically, inasmuch as those who promoted
adopting an SVP law in New Jersey were motivated by the desire to
lengthen the duration of civil detention for sex offenders, they
should be pleased with the results. According to a survey conducted
in the summer of 2002, New Jersey had an inpatient SVP population
of 223 with only two gaining release in the first three years the statute
95
went into effect.
CONCLUSION
Prior to the 1990s, the psychiatric commitment of sex offenders
was largely moribund. Statutes that existed were little enforced, and
96
new initiatives were not on the horizon. The Shriner case, and others
97
like it, changed all this. They ushered in a new wave of legislation
that allowed mentally disordered sex offenders to be committed at
the expiration of their criminal sentences based on mental
impairments otherwise insufficient for involuntary detention. As
these laws proliferated in the 1990s, the legal debate focused on the
constitutionality of this novel approach to sex-offender containment.
To this end, the U.S. Supreme Court considered challenges based on
98
SVP laws three times between 1997 and 2002. Thus, in 2004, we
have a much clearer picture of the constitutional landscape with
respect to SVP commitment than we did a few years ago.
Because the Court has all but foreclosed challenges based on the
Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses, our focus must now be
on whether the implementation of these laws satisfies due process,
ever mindful of Justice Kennedy’s admonition that “[i]f . . . civil
confinement were to become a mechanism for retribution or general
deterrence . . . [the Court’s] precedents would not suffice to validate
99
it.” Persistent refusal on the part of state officials to afford release
would provide persuasive evidence of this impermissible purpose, but
simply allowing discharge is not enough. Because SVPs have unique,
long-term treatment needs which state officials acknowledged as a

95

Fitch, supra note 4, at 492.
Cornwell, supra note 7, at 1297; Gleb, supra note 3, at 215.
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See, e.g., Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators in Kansas: A Modern Law for Modern Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887, 887 (1994)
(discussing the rape and murder of Stephanie Schmidt by a released sex offender
that inspired the passage of the Kansas SVP law).
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Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001)
(hearing claim that SVP statute violated ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses
requires proof that law is punitive “on its face” rather than as applied in practice);
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
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Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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basis for confinement and affirmatively obligated themselves to treat,
the state must continue to provide that treatment in the community
in fulfillment of their statutory guarantee and corresponding
constitutional mandate.
Some discharged SVPs may already be receiving state-sponsored
treatment; others may not. Some may be able to find qualified sexoffender therapists on their own; others may not. Some may be able
to pay for such treatment; others may not. By recognizing the
obligation of state officials to provide therapeutic services to all SVPs
discharged into the community from civil commitment, the
opportunity to retain their freedom will be equally available to all.

